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Operational Technology (OT) and Infrastructure Technology (IT) systems are converging
with the rapid addition of centralized remote management in OT systems. Previously
air-gapped systems are now interconnected through the internet with application-specific
protocols. This has led to systems that had limited access points being remotely accessible.
In different OT sectors, such as manufacturing, building automation, and the energy sector,
legacy protocols previously transmitted over serial communication were updated to utilize
TCP/IP connections for communicating with legacy devices. New protocols such as IEC61850 were also introduced for monitoring of different Distributed Energy Resources (DER).
The IEC-61850 standard’s Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) protocol
outlines the representation and communication of a variety of different components through
Publisher and Subscriber roles. Each publisher and subscriber are defined specifically on
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), which may differ in manufacturer and capabilities.
Therefore, each defined publisher and subscriber are network specific, so the different
topologies and data types sent can vary between networks. To support the different objects
represented in the protocol, customizable configurations for GOOSE supporting components
is required.
In this thesis, an effective, flexible, and practical testbed is introduced for evaluating
OT protocols, with a case study in the implementation of the GOOSE protocol on IEDs.
Common cyberattacks on the GOOSE protocol are identified and implemented on the
testbed with variable data rate generation. The display the versatility of the test bed’s
capabilities, attacks implemented include a Denial of Service (DoS), replay, and False Data

Injection Attack (FDIA). The tests are then executed on three separate GOOSE devices,
two devices from reputable manufacturers, and a Raspberry Pi running off an open source
library, libiec61850. Each device is configured with a separate IED Capability Description
in accordance with manufacturer instruction to ensure the test operated under valid operating
conditions.
The results of the tests show that, while complying with the protocol standard, each
device has different processing methods resulting in different strengths and weaknesses in
implementation. This thesis examines each device’s response to different attacks and their
implications in real world deployments. One such test resulted in the disabling of a relay,
which would lockout the relay until physical intervention to power cycle the relay is available.
Other attacks prevent devices from responding to any valid packets at all. Regardless of
implementation, the testbed provides a means of evaluating different protocol’s on-device
implementation and identification of vulnerabilities.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction

Operational Technology (OT) systems have begun to enhance interconnection capabilities
with recent advancements in distributed computing power, allowing for centralized remote
control of different systems. OT systems such as factory lines, building access systems,
or power girds, were once limited in remote management capability and did not have
capabilities for remote access. This achieved a means of security through physical access,
since attacks would not be feasible without physical access to the system. Now with greater
computing capabilities and affordability of devices have led to increased internet access
across OT networks.
The capability to utilize the internet to access once air-gapped systems allows for greater
monitoring of an entire system architecture. However, the additional connections create
security vulnerabilities that application-specific protocols are not designed to encounter.
OT systems also cover a wide range of industries and protocols used within them. A few
examples of industries are manufacturing, building automation, and the energy sector. In
my previous work with the Advanced Telecommunications Laboratory, we examined the
different protocols in the energy sector, and how these protocols can be implemented to
follow NIST Security Framework for Critical Infrastructure [1]. These protocols include
Modbus, DNP3, C37, and IEC-61850. In manufacturing, protocols such as Highway
Addressable Remote Transducer Protocol (HART), Foundation Fieldbus, Ethernet/IP, and
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Profibus [2] are used and were often updated from serial physical connections to Ethernet.
In building automation, BACnet is the international standard for communication between
different components [3].
A similar theme continues throughout each sector, that serial protocols such as Modbus[4] and DNP3[5] were updated to support TCP/IP connections, but were not updated
to support new data types, such as analog values like synchrophasors, provided by new
components. Their communication structure also relies on a Master and Slave topology,
requiring a request sent by the Master and lacking any encryption or data validation. The
challenge when implementing this over TCP/IP is the inability to validate the author or
keep a malicious actor from intercepting traffic. This provides a particular challenge when
keeping cybersecurity in mind for networks growing more interconnected.
Before the commissioning of devices to a live environment, thorough testing of a
configuration should be completed. Standard testbeds take a large investment of time
and space for accurate representations of specific configurations. As an alternative to
standard test beds, hardware in the loop (HIL) simulation platforms have been introduced to
emulate working conditions on the power grid, suitable for evaluation of individual device
configuration performance. However, validation should be completed in some form before
implementing devices into a live environment. In contrast to IT devices, the devices in the
OT sector are designed to be in use with zero downtime for months if not years. Due to this,
software or hardware updates can take extended amounts of time to incorporate, and a device
installed with an improper configuration could lead to outages on critical infrastructure.
For this thesis, a case study will be performed on the Generic Object Oriented Substation
Event (GOOSE) protocol specified in IEC-61850. This protocol is becoming commonly
implemented in the energy sector, due to the diverse data types and supported network
topologies. The additional context give to the protocol through the Substation Configuration
Language allows for customization for each systems specific services and required data
exchange. The exclusion of protocols such as IEC-61850 will become a less viable option
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in the future, since smart grids are increasing the number of Distributed Energy Resources
(DERs). The introduction of additional DERs creates additional challenges for load balancing, and without proper information distribution to engineers, the grid would face the
potential for preventable power failures.

1.1

Testbeds

OT testbeds, particularly in the energy sector, require a either a large investment in land
for a live testbed, or financial investment with the purchase of HIL simulators such as the
OPAL-RT or Typhoon HIL as examined in [6]. Testbeds for protocols specifically have
been less investigated but often utilize simulation rather than actual hardware. This is a
concern due to the assumption of identical protocol implementation and does not account
for hardware differences in different components.

1.1.1

Simulated Working Conditions

The ability to create working network conditions to evaluate protocol performance is
available in a variety of packages. The packages can be software developed for standard
operating systems, hardware devices with set functionality, or a combination of both. When
creating a testbed for evaluating OT protocols, the design choices can be differentiated by
the requirement for external hardware sources.
• Software Simulation Platforms allow for evaluation of network traffic and device
performance in a single or multiple software packages. Example software like OPALRT’s Hypersim or OPNET network simulator have support for IEC-61850 protocols
without the need for additional hardware investments.
– Advantages: The software packages have limited hardware requirements to run
other than the specific operating system requirements. The simulations do not
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run in real time, which means results can often be obtained faster than real world
results. These packages are ideal for measuring metrics like network latency.
– Disadvantages: Without additional hardware, these packages are not designed
to generate working signals that can be used to evaluate physical devices and
their responses to different operating conditions. Therefore, these packages are
not ideal for testing and commissioning of devices.
• Hardware Simulation Platforms provide many of the same benefits of Software
Simulation packages but with additional hardware to interact with physical devices.
However, configuration and setup of these devices can be a costly time investment.
The added benefit is the ability to test protocols and operation on live equipment.
Example Hardware platforms are OPAL-RT and Typhoon HIL.
– Advantages: The additional hardware is equipped to generate operating conditions with real time requirements. Given a finite step length, the hardware
package generates different signals at fixed intervals allowing devices under test
to perform as they would in a real world application.
– Disadvantages: Each hardware platform requires device specific software and
additional hardware setup after software completion. The simulations run in
real time as well, so creating and running a simulation model may take much
longer than their software counterparts. The devices also have limited hardware
resources, so additional designing may be required to create a model that can
adhere to the fixed interval step.
• Protocol Only Implementations provide a means of creating the live protocol traffic
to evaluate different devices. An example of a protocol only testbed is presented in
[7]. While protocol only implementations cannot test fully test the effect protocol
vulnerabilities will have on other operations within the Device Under Test (DUT).
For this thesis, we will implement a protocol only testbed, to evaluate differences in
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protocol implementation across different devices. In this thesis, we implement an
efficient, flexible, reliable protocol evaluation testbed, with the flexibility for creating
different cyberattack traffic at variable data rates.

1.2

IEC-61850

Substations have a variety of functionalities, ranging from transmission, distribution, and
increasing or decreasing voltage. This allows for a wide variety of configurations and communication channels in different power systems. With an increase in distributed processing
capabilities and IT/OT convergence, performance metrics that were previously unavailable
can be transmitted from substations to system operators. IEC-61850 outlines methods to
increase connectivity across a power grid, allowing for delivery of different system updates
through three different levels of communication, the process level, bay level, and station
level. For each of these different levels, the Sampled Values, GOOSE, and Manufacturing
Message Specification (MMS) protocols were defined, as shown in Fig 1.1.
Station Level:

Bay Level:

Station Host and HMI

MMS/GOOSE

Control and Protection

GOOSE

Process
Sensors and Actuators

Sampled Values

Figure 1.1: IEC-61850 Communication Between Substation Levels

Sampled Values
At the process level, analog values that would pertain to sensors or actuator measurements

6
are sent over the Sampled Values protocol. The devices monitored at this level are almost
entirely analog, so the packet’s data is formatted to represent analog values through digital
format. The protocol utilizes a publisher/subscriber model, that sends multicast Ethernet
packets to specific MAC addresses. There is no acknowledgment feature to the protocol
and individual device configurations determine reception and interpretation of Sample
Value packets.
GOOSE
Similar to the Sampled Values protocol, GOOSE protocol utilizes a similar publish and
subscribe model between components. However, GOOSE is intended for a variety of data
types that cannot be accurately represented through Sampled Value’s physical measurement
representation. For this, Abstract Syntax Notation (ASN) with individual data fields
determined by tag, length, and data fields. Due to the range of data that can be represented
by these packets, the GOOSE protocol is commonly used for both bay level and station
level communication. At the bay level, communication takes place between different
control and protection devices, such as relays and feeders. For communication with the
station level, the communication takes place between Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs)
and user level interfaces, such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) or
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) systems.
MMS
The MMS protocol is outlined in ISO-9506 and is based on clients and servers utilizing
the protocol over Ethernet. In smart grids, this is intended for use at the station level,
performing data transmission between deployed IEDs and operator monitored applications,
such as a RTU or SCADA system. This protocol utilizes TCP/IP routing, with specific IP
and port addresses for each client and server in the system.
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1.2.1

IEC-61850 Data Representation

IEC-61850 has defined structures for many forms of data that would be required for transmission in a substation. The data representation is defined in IEC61850-7-4[8], with individual
IED data being defined as logical nodes. Each of these logical nodes are then broken down
into data object types, with predefined data attributes and data structures. From a substation
perspective, the station level has individual bay levels to communicate with and each of the
bay levels have functions related to logical nodes. Each node has defined data objects based
on their logical node type, as shown in Fig 1.2.
IEC-61850 Data Hierarchy
Substation
Bay

Logical Device

Data Object

Logical Node Type

Structured Data
Object

Data Object

Data Attributes

IED

Logical Device

Figure 1.2: IEC-61850 Data Representation

1.3

IEC-61850 Substation Configuration Language

The Substation Configuration Language (SCL) is an XML based language implemented to
exchange pertinent information about a whole system and individual component’s data and
services[9], [10]. The number of components in an individual system can vary, so different
SCL file types are utilized to only send device specific information. The different types of
SCL files can be found in Table 1.1. For our implementation, a single substation is represented, so the System Configuration Description (SCD) and Configured IED Description
(CID) files are described in detail.
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File Type

Ext.

System Specific Description

SSD

System Configuration Description

SCD

IED Capability Description

ICD

Configured IED Description

CID

System Exchange Description

SED

Description
Combination of single line diagram system
description and individual device functions
Substation Automation system’s communication and function configuration.
Individual IED communication functions and
data model capabilities
IED configuration for all data needed from the
system.
Information for data exchange between substations

Table 1.1: SCL File Types

1.3.1

IEC-61850 Substation Configuration Description

The SCD file contains all functional and data information of a specific substation. This
file will contain information on each of the bay levels contained in the station, their IEDs
and logical devices. Since each IED configuration will also contain any logical relations
such as GOOSE or Sampled Value subscriptions, the SCD file also contains information
regarding the interconnection between the bay level and process level. These files are used
at the station level and give information to applicable RTU or SCADA systems.

1.3.2

IEC-61850 Configured IED Description

The CID file type is used to describe an individual IED’s configuration, specifically regarding
logical node, data type, and communication configurations. This file will contain information
specific to any GOOSE or Sampled Values publications and subscriptions, their MAC
addresses, priority, and data contents. While an IED may have the ability to publish
additional data, the specific values that will be monitored defined in this file. This file is used
to facilitate communication between an IED and the specific configuration tool software for
updating the IED configuration. The information in a CID file is also contained in the SCD
file, but the CID is limited to a specific IEDs configuration.
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1.4

Thesis Organization

The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the problem statement
of this thesis, concerning different GOOSE configuration performance in the presence of
cyberattacks. Chapter 3 provides a literature review of related works in this domain. Chapter
4 presents the proposed solutions and performance quantifiers for the problem statement.
Chapter 5 presents the numerical results, analysis and discussion of the proposed solutions.
And finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
Problem Statement

In this thesis, we propose an effective, flexible, and practical testbed to evaluate different
OT protocols. These protocols have use across different OT sectors, such as manufacturing,
building automation, and energy sectors. As a case study, the IEC-61850 GOOSE protocol
will be evaluated on different devices. While the testbed is capable of implementing different
protocols, cyberattacks are of particular interest to the GOOSE protocol due to the multicast
publisher and subscriber model. When taken into account that the events transmitted over the
protocol may have system critical information, such as a breaker’s tripped status, the ability
to evaluate different configurations and their susceptibility to attacks is a valuable tool for
vendors and consumers. The flexibility of SCL allows for systems to be as interconnected or
isolated as desired, so a focus on GOOSE network configurations with a variety of size and
number of publishers and subscribers to mimic different network topologies would need to
be developed and implemented.
These differing configurations would directly impact the normal operation conditions of
the IED, depending how many subscriptions it would process from the network. Moreover,
the ability to emulate these different working conditions without the development of a
standard test bed was evaluated. To accomplish the above objectives, we create working
conditions for an IED capable of GOOSE communication, select and configure a device
under test, and perform cyberattacks on potential vulnerabilities outlined in our literature
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Value
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Priority
1 (Lowest)
0 (Default)
2
3
4
5
6
7 (Highest)

Traffic Type
Background
Best Effort
Excellent Effort
Critical Applications
Video
Voice
Internetwork Control
Network Control

Table 2.1: 802.1Q Priority Codes

review. There are different methods for completing each of these objectives, so evaluations
of each option are outlined in this section, with our eventual implementation contained in
Chapter 4.

2.1

GOOSE Protocol

The GOOSE protocol has a defined structure for each packet being sent. The high level
fields can be seen in Fig 2.1. The source and destination MAC addresses are defined by
configuration files such as the SCD and CID files. As such, different stations may be using
the same MAC addresses for different data packets. The standard 802.1Q VLAN tag is used
each Ethernet packet, including the priority field that denotes a priority between 0 and 7[11].

Preamble

Start
Frame

Destination Source
MAC
MAC

802.1Q Tag
/
APPID
Ethertype

Length

APDU

Figure 2.1: GOOSE Packet

The remaining data fields are specific to the GOOSE protocol, with the APPID relating
directly to the publication frame in the SCD and CID files. The remaining packet fields are
contained in the APDU field, which is broken down into the fields shown in Fig 2.2. These
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SetEntries

allData

Figure 2.2: GOOSE APDU

fields do not all have self descriptive names, so a more in depth description of each of these
fields is found below:
• gocbRef: Reference to the logical node control block associated with the publication.
• timeAllowedtoLive: Time between next publication.
• datSet: Reference to logical node data set associated with the publication.
• goID: Individual message identifier.
• t: Timestamp of last data set change. Multiple packets may be sent with the same
value in the t field.
• stNum: State number of the GOOSE publication, which increments with changes in
data set.
• sqNum: Sequence number of the GOOSE publication, increments with each transmission the state number does not change.
• confRev: Increases with each data set configuration change.
• ndsCom: Needs commissioning. This field indicates errors in GOOSE configuration.
• numDatSetEntires: Number of entries to follow in allData field.
• allData: Contains data set in ASN.1 tag, length, data format.

2.2

Device Under Test

There are a variety of IED capabilities and configurations that can be evaluated as the device
under test for this model. With the availability of open-source libraries that can generate
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packets for different OT protocols, the ability to evaluate protocols without high cost IEDs
is possible. Low cost emulated IEDs can be evaluated for different configurations on low
cost embedded environments. Libiec61850[12] is one such example of a software library
with a completely implemented 61850 protocol stack. However, these devices have limited
use in live operations within the power grid. The alternative to this are production IEDs
from vendors aimed at the power grid.
The benefits of utilzing production IEDs for performance evaluation is the ability to test
specific vendor implementation of protocols. While conformance testing done by vendors
will confirm the correct implementation of the protocols that is not guaranteed with open
source libraries, the presence of vulnerabilities to cyberattacks may exist. The evaluation can
provide valuable information for consumers before implementing a product into their system.
The potential for identifying vulnerabilities can also aid existing systems in implementing
mitigation strategies.

2.2.1

GOOSE Configurations for Device Under Test

Substations have a variety of configurations that can be used to meet individual functional
needs. For this reason, GOOSE configurations can vary in different levels of interconnected
IEDs across different bay levels within a substation. There are added benefits to keeping the
system as connected as possible, such as logic implementation for load balancing that can
respond faster than physical contacts in the system. However, each publication that an IED
subscribes to can generate another avenue for attack. The evaluation should then compare
the performance of differing publications and subscriptions on the IED.
The configurations can also have differing priorities and VLAN configurations to alter the
deliver of information across a network. The priorities of each publication and subscription
are defined within the IEC-61850 standard [13]. By default, the VLAN ID assigned will be
0x001 but different devices for different bay levels can be placed on different VLANs for
efficient use of network space. The priority fields defined in 802.1Q denote the different
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types of packets being sent and their priority of evaluation, as outlined in Table 2.1.

2.3

Deliver Cyberattacks

When determining the method for cyberattack delivery, separate hardware and software
agents need to be identified and selected. In regards to hardware requirements, network
interfacing is the only hard requirement. Other functionality is not required for the scope
of cyberattacks, as packet manipulation can be done with an appropriate software package.
Existing hardware platforms such as Raspberry Pi or Arduino then have the available
hardware requirements. For this reason, creating a new hardware package for the delivery
method is not required. Currently available software packages that support the GOOSE
protocol have a rigid structure that do not allow for flexibility in packet manipulation. In
order to perform different cyberattacks on the device under test, either a new software
package would need developed or alteration of an existing package could be used.

2.3.1

Existing Software Packages for Cyberattack Delivery

The increasing number of open-source software packages that implement OT protocols
allows for a large number of options for introducing cyberattacks to the device under test.
When discussing the device under test, we already mentioned the software library for
libiec61850. However, the implementation of this library does not allow for individual
packet field manipulation for different attacks regarding FDIA or replay attacks. Scapy[14]
is a popular python package that allows for such packet manipulation, as well as custom
layer implementation. By default this package does not have the 61850 protocols, so the
requirement of writing an additional layer is added.
There are also existing dissectors from popular network analyzing softwares such as
Wireshark [15]. The benefit of these packages is the built in capability to interpret IEC61850 protocols. However, interacting with wireshark or its dissectors via tShark is not
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designed for real time applications due to the requirement of calling an external process
and awaiting returned results. This limits the ability of an agent to listen to current network
traffic, manipulate packets, and deliver attacks without considerable delay.

2.3.2

New Software Package for Cyberattack Delivery

Without the availability of a software package that meets all required needs for the protocol
evaluation, we could write a custom package for this purpose. The benefits of the package
are design customization to the specific requirements of our evaluation. However, there is
an increased development time for this approach and the requirement of recreating functionality that is widely implemented and documented in existing packages. The advantage of
creating a new package will allow for precise timing of packet delivery, allowing for evenly
spaced and precise attack traffic that are not directly supported by any packages mentioned
previously.
This reason, along with the ability to precisely control timing with the C programming
language, led us to use this option for this thesis. The customized software also allowed for
the optimization of required resources, creating the opportunity to use lower cost hardware
without degradation of performance. Chapter 4 will outline the steps taken to generate
required traffic and mitigate resource usage. This method also lends itself to scripting of
different test scenarios, allowing for limited intervention to collect the results that will be
displayed in Chapter 5.

2.3.3

Hardware Package for Cyberattack Delivery

With the selection of a custom software package being utilized for the testbed, the next step
was selecting a hardware package for attack delivery. There were multiple factors to consider
when deciding on a hardware package. These factors are network interacting to send and
monitor network traffic, and the ability to send or monitor signal lines. The most widely
available packages for this testbed would be a standard personal computer or embedded
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environment. In regards to a standard personal computer, the networking capabilities could
be easily implemented. However, the requirement for interacting with any signal lines
would require specialized hardware, that would have to be interfaced through a USB device.
In this regard, an embedded Linux device would be ideal, since these devices are easily
programmable, capable of reliable network communication, and have General Purpose Input
and Outputs (GPIO) for interfacing with signal lines. Embedded Linux devices also has a
variety of open source devices, such as the Raspberry Pi. This particular project uses the
Raspberry Pi 4B, shown in Fig 2.3. Utilizing a Raspberry Pi, the testbed can implement a
variety of OT protocols at standard data rates and monitor signals required for any OT signal
processing. In this case, the testbed will be used to send GOOSE protocol messages to the
DUT and read the digital output from the device to evaluate response time.

Figure 2.3: Raspberry Pi 4B
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CHAPTER 3
Literature Review

With the multicast nature of the GOOSE protocols, research has been conducted since
the protocol’s inception to outline vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies. Ashraf et. al [16]
outline the simple and effective nature of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on the GOOSE
protocol, which may cause failure of IEDs to respond as intended to legitimate grid events.
The DoS attacks can be simple as overloading the network with packets, which do not
necessarily need to have specific payloads. The authors in [17] show the efficacy of false
data injection attacks (FDIA) with limited knowledge of a subsystems configuration. By
replaying a packet with the same information, increment the state number, and flipping a
boolean value, an IED contact was tripped incorrectly. This attack could also be repeated on
different sniffed packets of the network until a desired result was achieved.
In [18], the authors illustrate different flooding attacks that IEC-61850 is susceptible to,
with specific examples for the station level. The outlined attacks utilize flooding at both
the MAC layer and application layer of a substation with direct access to a network switch.
These attacks showed delay in time critical delivery of Sampled Values and GOOSE protocol
packets. Specific attacks on the GOOSE protocol with protocol packet manipulation is
outlined in [19]. The attacks outlined show that affecting individual packet fields, such as
rapidly increasting the state number field of a GOOSE publication could pause reception of
critical events for 232 cycles. This added with the packet processing largely dependant on

18
manufacturer’s protocol processing state machine[20], outlines the need for vulnerability
assessment and external detection.
Several methods have been proposed for threat detection in systems implementing the
GOOSE protocol. An example of external detection of attacks utilizing an algorithm is
outlined in [21]. The reintroduction of one-time pads for lightweight authentication between
publishers and subscribers is outlined by the authors in [22] and an external detection system
resulting from monitoring network traffic is proposed in [23]. While each of these methods
show promising results with security focus, each method requires additional commissioning
of protocol features or external tools for specific systems.
The ability to add encryption would mitigate the affect of the aforementioned attacks.
In [24], IEC-62351 is utilized to encrypt GOOSE communication. Evaluations of the key
security was evaluated with the Scyther tool with live operation of ABB relays and an OPALRT OP5600. The results from this experiment founds that compliance with IEC-62351 still
has security vulnerabilities. However, the required network latency for GOOSE events being
published under 4ms [13] were shown to be breached when implementing the encryption of
IEC-62351 in [25].
A method of testing valid GOOSE communication with the OPAL-RT is introduced
in [26]. The test acted on a ABB relay to evaluate GOOSE performance from the ABB
relay on a DER as part of a larger network. This work also outlines operation of fixed
times steps within the simulator itself. OPAL-RT’s line of simulators operate by compiling
MATLAB/SIMULINK models into C code. As the complexity of a model increases, the
time required for computation to finish also increases. The authors [27] utilized an HIL
simulator platform to evaluate the whole IEC-61850 suite of protocols, with a specific focus
on the MMS protocol. Other evaluations of specific protection scheme configurations are
introduced in [28], with a focus on individual breaker configuration on system performance.
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CHAPTER 4
Methodology

This thesis aims to address the aforementioned prominent problem statements in the evaluation of vulnerabilities in vendor GOOSE protocol implementation. In the literature review,
we mentioned that compliance with GOOSE protocol standard does not guarantee resistance
to protocol vulnerabilities. To evaluate vendor implementation and possible vulnerabilities,
emulation of working conditions and cyberattacks would need to be developed.

4.1

Evaluation Structure

The evaluation structure relied on creating normal network traffic on the Ethernet port of
the Device Under Test (DUT), measuring response time and accuracy, and comparing those
results when the device is under protocol specific cyberattacks. In the literature review
chapter of this thesis, we mentioned the GOOSE protocol’s susceptibility to DoS attacks,
replay attacks, and FDIAs. The testbed outlined in this chapter utilizes two Raspberry Pi’s
to create normal GOOSE traffic and measure the response time, while the second generates
attacks at specific traffic rates for each vulnerability attack. A high level diagram can be
seen in Fig 4.1
The tests for each of the attacks were then tested against three different devices with
GOOSE communication capabilities. The first two devices were from reputable manufactur-
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Figure 4.1: Evaluation Testbed Topology

ers within the energy sector. The first device is a protection system, which allows for a wide
range of customization with the number of publishers or subscribers assigned. Configuration
for this device is a single subscription with one bit being tracked for measured response
time. This configuration is the lightest available for the device, allowing for prioritization
of only the measured subscription. The virtual bit measured for this configuration are to
measure the current value of a boolean value in the GOOSE subscription. For the rest of
this paper, this device will be referred to as Device 1.
Table 4.1: Hardware Utilized

Device
Raspberry Pi 4B [29]
Raspberry Pi 4B [29]
HP Spectre x360 [30]

CPU
BCM2711 @ 1.5GHz
BCM2711 @ 1.5GHz
i7-8550U @ 1.8GHz

RAM
4 GB
4 GB
16 GB

OS
Rasbian
Rasbian
Windows 10

The second device tested is a protective relay. The device is advertised as a more
general purpose device, and allows for a set number of GOOSE subscriptions. Similar to the
configuration of Device 1, this device, Device 2, was configured with a single subscription
with monitored boolean bit for output outlined in the traffic generation section of this chapter.
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The final device for testing was another Raspberry Pi with a GOOSE subscriber configured
with the C implementation of libiec61850. All devices for these tests were configured
without any other communication protocols active. These configurations were generated to
give the best case results for each device in response to each attack. The hardware utilized
for each role of the testbed framework can be seen in Table 4.1.
In order to streamline the testing of three devices without encountering a time constraint,
three different testbeds were created for each device. This required the utilization of three
different, separate switches to avoid any conflicts created with additional components
plugged into the switch. The switches utilized for the test beds can be found in Table 4.2.
This also allows us to eliminate the possibility of a switch affecting the testing of a certain
device. If results were unexpected or unable to be validated on a given switch, the tests could
be rerun on a separate switch to ensure results were directly caused by the attack traffic.
Table 4.2: Switches Utilized

Manufacturer
Netgear
Netgear
Cisco

4.2

Model
GS724T [31]
GS716T [31]
SG110-16 [32]

Link
Gigabit
Gigabit
Gigabit

Ports
24
16
16

Response Time Measurement

The first component created for the testbed was the GOOSE publisher. This device generates
GOOSE publications sent to the switch for the MAC address subscribed by the DUT. For the
tests conducted in this thesis, the publishing address is 01:1C:CD:01:00:03. The device then
reads the response from the DUT, expecting a 1 for a true boolean value and 0 otherwise.
The time response time is then measured, or timed out if more than 700 ms have passed. If a
timeout is detected, the sequence number is incremented rather than the state number. This
gives the device an opportunity to detect the same event, and follows the required GOOSE
messaging timing since 700 ms have already passed. Algorithm 1 summarizes the timing
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measurements when considering timeouts or a successful response.
Algorithm 1 GOOSE Publisher State and Timing Measurement.
Require: state, sequence, input
t0 ← Packet Send Time
tc ← Current Time
b0 ← Expected Boolean State
b1 ← Pin Logic State
failure = 1
while t1 < 700ms OR b0 != b1 do
t1 = tc − t0
end while
if t1 > 700ms then
failure = 0
sequence++
else
state++
end if
return f ailure

This method of measuring responses from the devices allows for the GOOSE publisher
to react to the DUT and removes wasteful cycles, as switching to a high when the input is
already high would result in a false positive. The tests run for each of the response times
were run for 1000 total cycles to allow for accurate measurement of response time and
successful measurement in a statistical approach. A cycle in this sense is defined as any
change in the state number of the GOOSE Publisher. For these tests, only the boolean value
was altered by the publishing agent to allow for usage of each cycle produced.

4.2.1

Input Measurement

While the Raspberry Pi would only require the connection of a GPIO and common ground
for measurement, the other devices tested used contact type digital outputs. The main
difference between these is the inability to produce voltage on their own. This is typical of
devices used on the power grid, as voltages and loads can vary for different applications.
This required an alteration to the connections from the publishing agent, as a voltage was
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required, but no common ground since the agent is reading back its own output. An example
of these connections can be seen in Fig 4.2.

Device
Under
Test

GOOSE
Publisher

GPIO 1
GPIO 2

Contact

Figure 4.2: Input Measurement Connections

This method of connections may lead to variation within the measured response time due
to contact uptake or release timing, so the statistical approach towards the results mentioned
in the previous section gives stronger confidence to the results outlined in Chapter 5.
However, there are still expected variations within the response, since the Raspberry Pi is
not a real time operating system. Due to these constraints, small variations within data will
not be considered a device shortcoming. Measurement of the response time was completed
with the WiringPi [33] library, since the library gives simple API calls to the individual
GPIO on the Raspberry Pi.

4.3

GOOSE Packet Generation

There are multiple software packages available that are capable of creating and generating
GOOSE packets. The most notable is scapy [14], which utilizes python to create customizable packets through customizable fields. However, scapy has not built in support for the
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GOOSE protocol and the sending methods utilized provided are not well suited for generating high traffic rates. For this reason, a new program was written in the C programming
language to allow for creation of new packets, alteration of existing packets, and sending of
packets.

4.3.1

Packet Creation

Packet generation is either completed through the use of default arguments or provided
parameters. The attacks in this thesis don’t require large alterations between attacks, so a
list of default parameters, which are hard coded into the program, were used. The required
parameters were outlined in 2, which included all fields required to generated a GOOSE
PDU and APDU. The process of generating a packet required parameters to be encoded
using the BER and ASN encoding, which required definition of each tag for the GOOSE
fields. These tags can be seen in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: GOOSE PDU Tags

Field
PDU
timeAllowedtoLive
goID
stNum
test
ndsCom
allData

Tag
0x61
0x81
0x83
0x85
0x87
0x89
0xAB

Field
gocbRef
datSet
t
sqNum
confRev
numDatSetEntires

Tag
0x80
0x82
0x84
0x86
0x88
0x8A

With proper construction of the header, data types needed to be encoded as well. The
tags for each data type can be seen in Table 4.4. The ability to craft different packets has
a few challenges regarding differing length between packets, as shown in Fig 4.3. A valid
GOOSE packet also contains 3 different length fields that are reliant on the remaining length
of the packet. These are, the length field, PDU length field, and allData length field. This is
in addition to the length fields for every field listed in the previous table, along with each
entry in the data set.
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Figure 4.3: BER Data Encoding

Due to these challenges, the packet was generated starting at the data set. Since every
field in the packet is required to use the same encoding scheme, a function which would
take the tag, raw data, and length to return the encoded string was created. With this basic
functionality implemented the packet was formed by creating the dataset, calculating the
length for the allData field, creating the rest of the APDU, calculating the PDU length field,
and then generating the rest of the GOOSE packet. This process is illustrated in Fig 4.4.
Table 4.4: GOOSE PDU Tags

Field
Boolean
Integer
Fload
Octet String
UTC Time
Boolean Array
UTF-8 String

Tag
0x83
0x85
0x87
0x89
0x8C
0x8E
0x90

Field
Bitstring
Unsigned Integer
Real
Visible String
Binary Coded Decimal (BCD)
Object ID
Structure

Tag
0x84
0x86
0x88
0x8A
0x8D
0x8F
0x2A

An important step in the packet generation that will save time in later alterations is the
indexing of data fields in the GOOSE packet. For every packet that will be created in the
program, the packet generation function will alter a specified packet buffer and list of field
indices. These indices are made available for every GOOSE field listed in the tables above.
For this reason, the data can be altered and resent as in the case of an FDIA, or to imitate a
valid GOOSE publisher.

4.3.2

Packet Alteration

The packet generation step mentioned the availability of packet indices for each field of the
GOOSE packet. With this information, attacks that require packet updates, like the FDIA
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Figure 4.4: GOOSE Packet Creation

with updated stNum and t fields can be properly executed. The additional capabilty that
should be considered is the additional length that may be added while changing packet fields.
While the time stamp is always 8 bytes long in the GOOSE protocol, the state number can
have any value up to a 32 bit integer. When this field exceeds 255, the length of the field
increases along with the packet length and pdu length, so any successful packet alteration
need to consider all effected length fields.

4.3.3

Packet Sending

The most influential step for writing our own packet generation is the requirement for precise
traffic control in attacks. While initial testing with large packets was able to sustain constant
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data rates, smaller packets closer to 100 bytes were much less reliable when using available
open source packages. To resolve this issue raw sockets were utilized, providing an method
to send the raw bytes directly to an interfaces address.

4.4

Attack Traffic Generation

The central component of the evaluation structure is the attacking agent, that generates
attack traffic to the switch. By having the attacker on a separate port, the attacks are similar
to real world attacks against the grid, where a malicious actor gains access to a network
and not the physical device itself. A central challenge to generating cyberattack traffic is
the data rate required of each attack. The devices tested in this thesis come attached with a
100BASE-Tx Ethernet ports, so accurate control of network traffic from 10-100 Mbps is
required for accurate results in response to cyberattacks.
When executing an attack, the attacking agent requires the option of changing packet
contents for each packet transmission. An example would be the False Data Injection Attack
(FDIA), which requires an updated timestamp and state number field before transmission of
a new packet. This is different from carrying out a DoS or replay attack, which can utilize
the same packet retransmitted for the desired traffic rate.

4.4.1

Traffic Rate Control

Transmitting at specified rates is a challenge for hardware constrained devices such as the
Raspberry Pi. While the provided architecture can be executed without issue on desktops
with greater resources, validating operation on the Raspberry Pi will allow for accurate
control on a wider range of hardware. The first technique used to ensure accurate traffic
generation is traffic generation in bursts. The goal with bursting the traffic is to reduce the
required precision timing on the part of the Raspberry Pi, as 100 Mbps can require as many
as 100k packets to be sent per second. With the introduction of bursts, traffic under 30 Mbps
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will send 100 bursts per second, 30-80 Mbps traffic will send 300 bursts per second, and
greater than 100 Mbps will send 500 bursts per second. This limits the maximum number
of packets sent in a single burst, while allowing the built in Linux timers to keep up with
scheduling packet transfers.
These burst numbers were created through trial and error, as smaller burst sizes with more
occurrences worked well on desktop environments, but not in an embedded environment. An
advantage to the bursts is the required resolution for our timers only needs to track down to
2 ms, compared to 10 µs required if bursts were not utilized. The tests for determining burst
size were executed with a 125 byte long packet. This is small for the GOOSE protocol and
requires more packets to match the required traffic generation. Completion of testing with
these small packets led to the same accurate performance with larger packets, since there
are less packets that require sending to the socket. The method of timing and scheduling
packets is described in Algorithm 2.
The main addition in traffic generation to the burst is the addition of the slept flag. In
linux operating systems, there is no guaranteed resources for the whole run time of the attack.
This is mitigated by checking the current elapsed time compared to the next scheduled burst.
If the current time is behind, the next burst will double in size and attempt to complete 2
bursts in a single cycle. This, along with increasing the priority of the attacking process
using the "nice" command created reliable traffic generation that will be outlined in Chapter
5.

4.5

Cyberattacks

Chapter 3 outlined the current research being undertaken for GOOSE communication
protocol vulnerabilities. To include the most common attacks against the GOOSE protocol
specifically, DoS, Replay, and FDIA attacks were implemented in a single attack program.
The software for the attacking agent was written in the C programming language, utilizing a
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Algorithm 2 Traffic Generation Timing
Require: load, duration, packets, bursts
tn ← current time nanoseconds
ts ← current time seconds
burst size = packets / bursts
burst duration = 1000000000 / bursts
temp burst = burst size
elapsed = 0
while elapsed < duration do
sent = 0
slept = 0
current burst = tn
while sent < packets do
next burst = current burst + burst duration
if slept then
burst size = 2 * burst size
next burst = current burst + burst duration
slept = 0
end if
for i in burst size do
send packet
end for
burst size = temp burst
sent += burst size
current burst = tn
if current burst > next burst then
slept = 1
else
while current burst < next burst do
current burst = tn
end while
end if
end whileelapsed = ts
end while
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packet generation format implemented without external libraries. The packets for generating
the attacks were all created using default parameters provided in the attack program itself.
The parameters provided externally are the traffic load, required duration, and state
number attack flag. These parameters all expect integers for input values, so precision of
attacks is accurate to 1 Mbps increments and whole seconds. While operation of attacks
higher than 100 Mbps are accepted from this method, these would exceed the saturation
point of the Ethernet link for our DUTs and will not be tested. The final flag indicates the
usage of the state number attack. When this flag does not equal 0, the state number attack
is implemented with the timestamp and state number fields updated at ever packet sending
iteration.

4.5.1

DoS Attack

The DoS attacks goal is to saturate a link, overwhelm the attack endpoint, and cause an
inability of a device to respond to regular traffic. These attacks are easily detectable by
netowrk monitoring software and are typically mitigated by cybersecurity practices outside
of the DUT itself. For the implementation of this attack, a predefined GOOSE packet that
is not regularly in use by the network is generated and delivered at the specified data rate
calculated by the attacking agent. This attack has the least complexity of the other attacks
and requires no knowledge of the current GOOSE implementation on the network.

4.5.2

Replay Attack

The replay attack generation has many similarities to the Denial of Service attack, with
an exception to the packet contents. The replay attack intercepts an valid GOOSE packet
present on the network, and re-transmits the packet at a later time to confuse the IED
into discarding newer valid packets. These attacks are mitigated by the state number and
timestamp fields of the GOOSE protocol, but sent at high rates can cause the IED to fail
to process valid packets in addition to attack packets. In terms of complexity, this attack
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typically requires access to the network to capture packets before attacking. This requires
some knowledge of the GOOSE protocol but is low complexity once the initial GOOSE
packet is obtained.

4.5.3

FDIA

The FDIA in this thesis is also referred to as the state number attack. For this attack to be
properly carried out, a valid GOOSE publication needs to be generated, with a valid time
stamp and state number field to trick the IED into only processing the attacking packets. In
the GOOSE protocol, changes in a publication status are indicated with the state number
field. In normal operation of the protocol, the state number field rarely changes. So the
injection of valid packets with higher state numbers can trick the IEDs into interpreting
valid packets as outdated. To mitigate the chances of devices interpreting the attack traffic
as out of sequence, the attacks performed in this thesis start with a state number of 0 and
increase until the attack is completed.
With this attack, there is some concern for the state number rolling over. However, the
state number is an unsigned 32 bit integer, allowing for 4,294,967,296 states before this
would happen. Given our highest attacking rate is 100 Mbps, and our smallest packet is 125
bytes, then we can attack a DUT for over 11 hours without fear of the state number rolling
over. However, this attack can increase in complexity and generate incremented sequence
numbers as well. By updating the state number well above the current state of the device,
the sequence number can be incremented in normal GOOSE intervals without detection.
While this attack has the highest complexity of the three, it is also the most difficult to
detect. A well executed state number attack does not require the same bandwidth that DoS
or replay attacks consume and would be harder to detect without manual review of network
traffic. This attack is usually mitigated by controlling port access on a switch. Most IEDs
recommend that typical remote access protocols be disabled in order to prevent external
access. This, paired with dedicated VLANs for IED networks can reduce the availability of
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the attack on deployed devices.

4.6

Result Collection

The final component of this test bed is the scripting laptop. The laptop is connected to the
switch and has the task of starting regular traffic from the GOOSE publishing device, attack
traffic from the attacking agent, and Wireshark network monitoring to verify attack traffic
rates. The publisher and attacking agent have SSH enabled, allowing for tasks to be started
remotely at the same time without manual intervention. Individual test and response times
are logged at the GOOSE publisher, so the scripting laptop collects and stores individual
run results for ever iteration of the testing process.

4.6.1

Scripting Process

With the tasks defined, the scripting process was completed with the Python programming
language. This allows for simple cross-platform implementation. While the current scripting
laptop is running Windows 10, the code could be repurposed to run on other operating
systems with limited code alterations. The scripted is intended to allow for multiple long
running tests to be run sequentially without the need for physical intervention. In order
to accomplish this task, a list of parameters for each run are given to the script. For each
parameter, individual SSH sessions are setup for each publishing and attacking agent. Their
respective programs are initiated along with Tshark for monitoring of attack traffic. Once
the scripts have run to completion, the next set of parameters is loaded and the process is
repeated, until no long parameters remain. The software flowchart for the script process can
be seen in Fig 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Test Scripting Flowchart

4.6.2

Testing List

To compare the different operating characteristics of the 3 different devices tested in this
thesis, a baseline response time for each device is established by running the device with
no attack traffic for 1k cycles. Each attack outlined in the previous sections will then be
run with traffic levels of 10 - 100 Mbps, incrementing by 10 Mbps each time. This allows
for comparison of the device response to each attack to the device baseline as well as other
attacks. The complete list of tests can be found in Table 4.5. The three devices tested were
discussed in a previous section and are labelled as Device 1, Device 2, and a Raspberry Pi.
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Table 4.5: Test List

Device

Baseline

Device 1
Device 2
Raspberry Pi

1k Cycles
1k Cycles
1k Cycles

4.7

DoS
10-100 Mbps
10k Cycles
10k Cycles
10k Cycles

Replay
10-100 Mbps
10k Cycles
10k Cycles
10k Cycles

FDIA
10-100 Mbps
10k Cycles
10k Cycles
10k Cycles

Total
31k Cycles
31k Cycles
31k Cycles

DUT Configuration

Each individual device requires a different configuration to properly respond to the publishing agent’s messages. Device 1 requires the use of multiple software to enable GOOSE
subscription, and then the virtual bit needs to be mapped to an output in a separate software
to enable the output in response to specific messages. Device 2 can manage GOOSE implementations and map a virtual bit to their output logic matrix for responding to a GOOSE
message. Each of the devices for these tests were left in their default state, without other
protocols enabled to prevent interference with the test results.
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CHAPTER 5
Results, Analysis and Discussion

In this chapter, we will present the numerical results for the attacking agent’s traffic
generation, the response to different attacks from the different DuT, and compare their
results. The results for each device tested will be broken down into their baseline, response
to DoS and Replay attacks, and response to FDIA. Analysis of these results and future work
will be outlined at the end of this chapter.

5.1

Publishing Agent

The publishing agent has limited requirements for successful implementation, with the
requirements being publishing valid GOOSE protocol and having it be interpreted by the
DuT. For this section, we demonstrate successful decoding from Wireshark, shown in Fig
5.1. This is meaningless however, if the DuT does not recognize the packet, so Fig 5.2
shows Device 1’s GOOSE subscription status, with incremented state and sequence number.
If these packets were not interpreted, the state and sequence number would remain at 0.
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Figure 5.1: Publisher’s Wireshark Packet Decoding

Figure 5.2: Device 1’s GOOSE Statistics

5.2

Attacking Agent

When developing the attacking agent, there were two different traffic scenarios to consider,
the traffic at the attacking agent, and the traffic after the switch. However, this traffic is also
useless if the packet does not conform to the GOOSE protocol. The results shown in this
section outline the correct generation of GOOSE protocol packet and sending these packets
at the desired data rate for a given attack.

5.2.1

Packet Generation

The first step for the attacking agent was ensuring the individual packets sent by the
attacking agent were valid GOOSE packets. Without this step, the attacks would not have
the intended effect on each DuT, and would be discarded by each device for being improperly
formatted. Fig 5.3 shows the decoding of the packet in wireshark, showing that the packets
are recognized as GOOSE packets.
These packets were also received by Device 1 for testing, since a live view of subscription
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Figure 5.3: Attacking Agent Wireshark Decode

status is available. For this screenshot, shown in Fig 5.4 the replay attack packet was utilized,
so the device would attempt to decode given the valid destination address. However, the
timestamp is invalid, so the packets are shown as corrupted. A screenshot showing valid
packet decoding will be shown in the FDIA section of this chapter.

Figure 5.4: Replay Attack from Device View

5.2.2

Attack Generation

With the packet generation properly operating, the traffic generation is executed as shown
in 2. The results shown in Fig 5.5 show the traffic levels generated by the attacking agent
for values 10-120 Mbps for 35 minutes each. During this test, there are variable spikes, as
resource allocation is not guaranteed in the Raspberry Pi, but Table 5.1 shows the average
traffic generation over the whole test duration has an error rate of less than 0.7%.
A reason for measuring the traffic of the network at both the attacking agent and device
under test shows that the link saturation occurs at an earlier traffic rate than expected. In
networks with managed switches, we expect there to be a point before the link meets the
100 Mbps data rate that the switch no longer allows packets to go through. In this case, we
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Figure 5.5: Attacking Agent Sustained Traffic

see that point to be 84.4 Mbps. For this section, the test was repeated at 1 minute intervals
rather than 35 minutes, and returned the same saturation point for each test. That explains
why there is a higher error rate at the DUT past 80 Mbps, as the device is receiving the
maximum allowed traffic.

5.2.3

Attack Results for Device Testing

Once the traffic generation was validated with the long running test shown in Fig 5.5,
the testing was initialized on all 3 devices. Initially, a test run was completed on a new
Raspberry Pi, without the increased priority of the "nice" command and WiFi and Bluetooth
still enabled. The results shown in 5.6 illustrate the issue without requiring more resources
for the Raspberry Pi. Lower traffic cases are unaffected, but higher data rates can get suck,
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such as 90 Mbps being stuck at 83 Mbps. There is also an issue of failing to catch up to the
desired data rate. The traffic will jump up to 180 Mbps for a few seconds to try and recover.
This is a downfall of not using a more complex algorithm that tracks per second traffic but
can be mitigated utilizing the increased operating priority.

Figure 5.6: Attacking Agent With Low Priority

With the method for producing consistent traffic generation identified, the DoS, Replay,
and FDIA attacks were executed on the three devices. Later in this chapter, we’ll discuss
why the FDIA attacks were not included in this figure, due to inability of devices to respond
at any attack traffics. The attack traffic generated for each device is shown in Fig 5.7, Fig
5.8, and Fig 5.9. The results shows the output from the attacker for each test, and we can
observe that the traffic rate errors encountered with sporadic traffic were eliminated. When
running these tests on each DUT, three different Raspberry Pi’s were utilized, showing each
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is able to output comparable results.

Figure 5.7: Device 1’s Attack Traffic

5.3

Device 1

The first device tested was Device 1. This device was the most expensive tested and delivered
the most unexpected results. The baseline results showed a fast response time to any GOOSE
event and a resistance to DoS and low traffic replay attacks. However, later sections will
show the device was unable to handle higher attack data rates and was actually disabled and
unable to respond.
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Figure 5.8: Device 2’s Attack Traffics
Table 5.1: Traffic Test: Expected vs. Actual

Expected
10000000
20000000
30000000
40000000
50000000
60000000
70000000
80000000
90000000
100000000
110000000
120000000

Attacker
Device Under Test
Actual
% Error
Actual
% Error
10010050.7 0.100507 10011456
0.11
20013620
0.0681
19927015
0.36
30013394.8 0.044649 29922947
0.26
40274380.7 0.685952 39924444
0.19
50057098.7 0.114197 49933272
0.13
60015123.4 0.025206 59933035
0.11
70018766.7 0.02681 69964742
0.05
79683505.8 0.395618 79567073
0.54
90012522.9 0.013914 84326689
6.30*
100014383 0.014383 84326625 15.67*
110022673 0.020611 84326537 23.34*
120014597 0.012164 84326552 29.73*
* - Caused by link saturation
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Figure 5.9: Raspberry Pi’s Attack Traffic

5.3.1

Device 1 baseline

The initial results without attack traffic shown in Fig 5.10, give a tight grouping of responses
under 10 ms. The publisher for this test cycled the boolean between on and off states every
1-4 seconds. This created a random element to the switching time, while creating valid
sequence increasing packets in between the rising state value. Device 1 also allows for live
view of GOOSE subscription statistics, which showed 0 dropped packets during testing.
This shows under normal operating conditions, Device 1 is a fast, reliable device in response
to GOOSE events.
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Figure 5.10: Device 1 baseline Response Time

5.3.2

Device 1 DoS and Replay Attack

The DoS and Replay attacks provided surprising results, which are shown in Fig 5.11.
The DoS attack had seemingly no effect on Device 1’s response time, with the responses
hovering around 6ms and not exceeding 7ms on average. This is due to the processing
cycles Device 1 uses, which do not process any packets that have an invalid destination
MAC address. From the packet generation discussion of Chapter 4, the packets utilized for
this attack are coded to utilize a valid GOOSE destination MAC address. However, this does
not guarantee the packets are being sent to an address that the device is listening on. The
lack of effect on at data rates up to 100 Mbps, show that the managed switch is limiting the
number of packets sent to the device from our attacking agent, while allowing regular traffic
to be sent to the device. We can also see that the device has no issue filtering the packets,
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even at data rate close to the link maximum.

Figure 5.11: Device 1 DoS vs Replay Response Time

The replay attack provided the most surprising responses. We can observe the curves
that the response time seems to uptick and match DoS at a traffic level of 20 Mbps. With
additional testing, it is expected that all response times will closely converge with the DoS
response time. This variance is likely due to the small number of successful responses in the
data set. The tests were run sequentially, with each 1k cycles taking roughly 35 minutes,
with a total run time of roughly 7 hours.
The replay tests were scripted and run overnight, with the error shown in Fig 5.12
awaiting in the morning. This explains the drop from responding at 30 Mbps to no response
at 40 Mbps. The exact cause of this error is further explored in the next section of this
chapter. The success rate of each device is graphed and compared in the Comparison section
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of this chapter. An important take away from this graph is the lack of impact the attack
had on response time. If the valid packet sent from the publisher was not discarded due to
receive overflow, the response time remained consistent for ever iteration. This implies that,
while the relay remains active, attacks will not cause a response time issue on the network.
It also shows that given enough re-transmissions, the relay will eventually operate to the
correct state. This can still be detrimental to the network’s operation, as GOOSE messages
are meant for high priority event with fast reactions. The exact success rate of Device 1
against replay attacks will be examined in the Comparison section of this chapter.

5.3.3

Device 1 Relay Disabled

At the conclusion of the replay attack testing, the error shown in Fig 5.12 was shown on
Device 1’s front display. While there is no indication of what caused the relay to become
disabled, the User’s Manual shows either operating system check failure or CPU error would
cause this response during a self test. The corrective action recommended for this error
is automatic restart of the relay. However, no method of communicating with the device
proved effective, and the device required a power cycle to resume normal operation.

Figure 5.12: Device 1 Disabled After Attack

After resuming normal operation, a self test was conducted on the device to ensure no
lasting errors persisted through the restart. As shown in Fig 5.13, the device restarted without
any present errors and additional self tests showed the same results. There were no external
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devices outside the testbed structure connected to the switch, so different configurations
were tested for causing the error in the Replicating the Error section of chapter.

Figure 5.13: Device 1 Post Disabled Restart

5.3.3.1

Replicating Device 1 Relay Error

The first step taken to identify the cause of relay disabling was to verify the same operation
occurred with different configurations of the device. The first option tested was different
attack rates for both replay and state number attacks. The results from these attacks can be
seen in Table 5.2. In order to identify reliable replication of the results, traffic rates starting
at 100 Mbps down to 10 Mbps were executed in 5 minute intervals to determine the time the
relay disabled for each attack. From the results, we can see that when the relay did disable,
it occurred at 30 seconds into a sustained attack, and tripped every time the attack traffic
was at a threshold traffic level. For replay attacks, this rate was 58 Mbps, while FDIA only
required 53 Mbps.
Intuitively, these numbers make sense, as GOOSE message headers take 8 processing
points and the boolean value we have mapped takes an additional 1 point. However, 58
Mbps is not exactly

9
8

of 53 Mbps, and the disabling time is a consistent 30 seconds

regardless of traffic rate over this threshold point. Through multiple tests of 57 and 52 Mbps
for the respective attacks, the relay would occasionally disable at attacks greater than 60
seconds, but these results could not be reliably reproduced. There was also a concern that
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Table 5.2: Traffic Test: Disabling Relay

Replay Attack
Traffic Rate Disabled Time
10 Mbps
Not Disabled
20 Mbps
Not Disabled
30 Mbps
Not Disabled
40 Mbps
Not Disabled
50 Mbps
Not Disabled
58 Mbps
30 Seconds
60 Mbps
30 Seconds
70 Mbps
30 Seconds
80 Mbps
30 Seconds
90 Mbps
30 Seconds
100 Mbps
30 Seconds

FDIA
Traffic Rate Disabled Time
10 Mbps
Not Disabled
20 Mbps
Not Disabled
30 Mbps
Not Disabled
40 Mbps
Not Disabled
50 Mbps
Not Disabled
53 Mbps
30 Seconds
60 Mbps
30 Seconds
70 Mbps
30 Seconds
80 Mbps
30 Seconds
90 Mbps
30 Seconds
100 Mbps
30 Seconds

external factors may have caused these results, so the tests were rerun with different device
configurations of output contacts, switches, and virtual bits.
The output contacts utilized for this testing were OUT101, OUT102, and OUT103. Each
contact was tested with the same data traffic rate and length with the same results. The
process was repeated for each switch utilized outlined in Chapter 4. The same process was
then completed with the use of a different virtual bit in Device 1 with the same results. The
only hard requirement found for duplicating the disabling result is the sustained traffic for
30 seconds. This led to us identifying two factors that affect the disabling of the relay as
the attack data rate and sustained traffic time. If the attack traffic was not sustained for a
full 30 seconds, and the data rate was not at or above the threshold, the relay would not be
disabled. This was validated by running an identical attacks but pausing the traffic before a
full 30 seconds completes. If the traffic was stopped short before the full 30 seconds had
elapsed, the relay would not disable. The relation of attack traffic compared to sustained
time is located in Fig 5.14.
The implications of this error could be detrimental to systems that employ multiple
models of Device 1 with GOOSE subscriptions. The attack complexity required to completed
this attack is low, requiring only a valid MAC of a GOOSE subscriber and the ability to
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Figure 5.14: Device 1 Attack Disable for Packet Size 125 Bytes

replay that packet. The device is also disabled until a hard restart of the system, requiring a
complete power cycling to return to normal operation. Properly configured networks may
take into account cybersecurity methods that would mitigate the affects of these attacks, but
a resolution to this problem that does not require physical access to the device should be
investigated.

5.3.3.2

Possible Causes of Device 1 Error

The first cause may be directly related to the CPU usage, the two causes of the specified error
could the the Operating System check failure or CPU error. Since there is an identifiable
threshold of traffic that causes the error, the CPU may be maxed resources once the traffic
rate is hit. From there, a sustained threshold for 30 seconds may be an internal timer, such
as a Watchdog Timer, that throws the error itself. Device 1 runs on Device 1’s own special
Linux operating system, so identifying this as the cause would be infeasible from our current
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attack setup.
The second possibility is the error is caused by firmware issues. There have been
a number of firmware updates since Device 1 was purchased, and the current version
of firmware on Device 1 is outdated. This is particularly interesting because the more
recent releases of firmware mention deliberately crafted Ethernet traffic could cause either
diagnostic or safety restarts. However, neither of these update notes mention the relay being
disabled, and diagnostic restarts should generate an event report on the device itself. In
future work, testing the device on upgraded firmware would be required to verify if the
device has already been patched for this issue.

5.4

Device 2

Device 2 was the next device to be tested with the evaluation structure. Device 2 is marketed
toward different functionality than Device 1 and is aimed toward medium voltage general
purpose use. The configuration for Device 2 consisted of a single GOOSE subscriber, with a
single virtual bit mapped to the output matrix for an output contact. The baseline results
show a far wider range of response times in comparison to Device 1, with a much higher
response time at just under 15 ms. The DoS and replay attacks showed similar behavior to
Device 1, but Device 2 was still able to respond even after a full 6 hour run through all traffic
levels of the attack. While the response time my not have been impressive, the robustness of
the system was a strong point.

5.4.1

Device 2 baseline

From the baseline results shown in Fig 5.15, we can see that the responses from Device 2 are
consistently slower than that of Device 1. While Device 2 is unable to respond in the same
timeframe as Device 1, the response rate was 100% at the baseline testing with 0 dropped
packets. There is an alternate configuration available for Device 2 that was not available
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Figure 5.15: Device 2 baseline Response Time

on other devices tested, which is the ability to ignore the goID field of a subscription. This
configuration was not tested in this Thesis, but examination of the configuration could lead
to similar results and slow response time under attack traffic, even without properly encoded
packets. If Device 2 isn’t checking the goID of the packet, the main checks would need to
be done at the MAC address. Without additional checks, attackers could broadcast to an
existing GOOSE endpoint without having to properly craft a packet.

5.4.2

Device 2 DoS and Replay Attack

The timing results from the DoS matched closely to what was expected after examining
Device 1 results. The timing of responses remained close to the initial baseline testing,
staying around 15 ms per response time. However, as soon as Device 2 began processing
replay attack packets, the response time grew by 30 times. Responses that normally took 15
ms now took an excess of 450 ms. However, Device 2 ran into no issues after the attacks had
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stopped and would resume normal operation without any issues from the attacks previously.
The dip at 60 Mbps is likely due to the small number of successful responses by the device,
and it is expected to rise to above 450 ms with additional testing. The main takeaway from
this execution is Device 2 is unable to maintain solid response times when attack packets
must also be processed. This is in contrast to Device 1, which as a defined processing cycle
and will discard any overflow. The responses here indicate Device 2 attempts to decode
more packets but can’t keep up with the processing time.
Device 2 may not have the same issues as Device 1 because it does not identify the
operating system utilized. Attempts to establish a virtual com connection through the USB
port gives limited information when compared to the protocol statistics shown above. In fact,
typing in typical linux commands gives the error "This is not a UNIX machine". So without
a proper investigation into the operating system in use, there would be little information to
draw further conclusions on the response time.

Figure 5.16: Device 2 DoS vs Replay Response Time
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5.5

Raspberry Pi

The Raspberry Pi has the most unique results from the 3 devices that were tested in this
thesis. This device is the only that doesn’t activate a contact that can be used in higher
voltage scenarios. In this situation, the only shared connections are a single digital I/O signal
and a reference ground. Activating a contact can add multiple milliseconds, and in the case
of Device 1, is rated for less than 5 ms. This means that the timing of the Raspberry Pi
should not be directly compared to the previous devices.
The purpose of this comparison is to examine the implementation of the GOOSE protocol
utilizing the libiec61850 library. There is also a consideration that should be made for the
other processes the previous devices complete. For this testing the Raspberry Pi is running
the Xorg desktop environment, but no other userspace processes than the GOOSE subscriber.
The results from the Raspberry Pi were surprisingly positive. The use of a 1 Gigabit Ethernet
port mitigated the reduction of response times found in the other tested devices, and the
response time was remarkably stable up until the 100 Mbps attack traffic.

5.5.1

Raspberry Pi baseline

The baseline results from the Raspberry Pi show a tight grouping with a response time
centering around .18 ms. There are more outliers in the graph than compared to the other
devices however. The reason for this is the inability to guarantee resources in the Rasbian
operating system. While most iterations will receive the required resources, the outliers
are created when other processes require additional resources that limit the processing of
the subscriber. This fact should be considered when using the Raspberry Pi for GOOSE
applications.
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Figure 5.17: Raspberry Pi baseline Response Time

5.5.2

Raspberry Pi DoS and Replay Attack

Similar to the previous devices tested, the Raspberry Pi had no noticeable issues when processing packets while the DoS attack was executed. This is not a surprise when considering
the attack was being executed on a Gigabit link. The replay attack resulted in similar results
as the other devices. However, there were limited missed responses from this device than
the previously tested. This is likely caused due to the limited processes run in the user space
compared to time sensitive operations required of the previous devices.

5.6

FDIA - All Devices

The FDIA executed in this thesis was a state number attack. The goal of this attack is to
force the IED to miss valid responses from the publishing agent by producing valid packets
with a higher state number. An example of FDIA traffic can be seen in Fig 5.19. When
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Figure 5.18: Raspberry Pi Response Times

executing this attack, each device was unable to respond to valid packets. The cause of
this is the limited number of packets required to outpace the state numbers found in regular
GOOSE traffic.

Figure 5.19: State Number Attack Wireshark Decode
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An example of this is the execution of an FDIA with 1 Mbps data rate. Even at the
lowest supported data rate for the testbed, each device was still unable to respond to valid
packets. In Fig 5.20, we can see the result of executing the state number attack at 1 Mbps for
1 second results in a state number of 2011. This state number can be increased to a value 232 ,
which would theoretically prevent standard GOOSE messages from ever being published.
In Chapter 4, the testing outline indicated that the FDIA would take 10k cycles, for traffic
levels from 10-100 Mbps. However, when testing was completed with the 100 Mbps traffic,
no device was capable of responding. To see if any other attacks would give responses, the
10 Mbps attack was run next. As we anticipated, there were no responses from any devices
throughout the test. These results were anticipated since we are using 125 byte packet length.
To achieve a data rate of 10 Mbps, we would need to send a total of 10k packets per second
to achieve the required data rate. Seeing 10k events on the standard GOOSE protocol traffic
would take an extended period of time, and we’ve tricked the devices to expect that state
number in a single second.

Figure 5.20: State Number Attack Device 1 Statistics

While there are no expected responses during the attack execution, once the time to live
expires on the last packet sent, both Device 1 and Device 2 were able to respond to standard
traffic. By implementing the protocol in this way, the devices are able to recover from an
attack without external intervention. However, our current implementation on the Raspberry
Pi required a restart. This is due to the comparison only checking valid packet time to live
and state number. If there was a timeout implemented for the time to live, the Raspberry
Pi would be able to respond as well. This is a perk of the open source implementation in
libiec61850, as the functionality can be altered to meet application needs.
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5.7

Device Comparison of Attack Responses

From the previous sections, the response times for Device 1, Device 2, and the Raspberry Pi
were examined for DoS and replay attacks. One aspect that has not been examined yet is the
successful response percentage of each device for the replay attacks in Fig 5.21. The DoS
was not plotted in this graph because each device successfully responded to every packet.

Figure 5.21: Replay Attack Successful Response Rates

We can see that the Raspberry Pi has the highest response rate, followed by Device 1 and
Device 2. However, the Raspberry Pi did see a large drop in accuracy at 100 Mbps, which
could be the limit to raw processing the device can handle. This port was also not limited to
the 100 Mbps link like the other devices, so switch queuing could have had an effect on the
responses. An interesting note is both Device 1 and Device 2 show significant reduction in
response at 10 and 20 Mbps, but the response percentages level out rather than decreasing at

57
each step as initially expected. This could be common behavior between the two devices
that could indicate a cyberattack. For Device 1, the accuracy remains comfortably higher
than Device 2, until the relay was disabled from the attack. However, at that point Device 2
was only responding to 10% of events.

5.8

Device GOOSE Implementation Analysis

The three different devices tested presented different protocol implementations that have
a variety of benefits and downfalls. In the case of Device 1, the device has fast response
times and reasonable successful response rate in the response to attacks. However, the major
downfall is encountered when the relay is disabled by cyberattacks. To this point, we were
unable to restart the device from an encountered fault without physically power cycling the
device.
This is contrasted by Device 2, which has much slower response times and responds to
considerably less messages when an attack is present. However, Device 2 was subjected to
continuous testing without any errors occurring. Even with resetting of publishing traffic,
the device was able to properly respond to valid GOOSE packets. The Raspberry Pi running
libiec618520 was a pleasant surprise by providing a perfectly reasonable implementation of
the GOOSE protocol.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Work

In this thesis, we created an effective, flexible, and practical testbed for OT protocols.
Based on two Raspberry Pis, the testbed allows for cyberattack generation, standard traffic
generation, and monitoring signal lines of a DUT. As part of the testbed validation, variable
traffic rates were tested for cyberattacks, and a reliable traffic generation between 10-120
Mbps was achieved with packets as small as 125 bytes. Through the use of traffic bursts
and a timing algorithm, we were able to reliably send 120k packets per second. While this
testbed is capable of evaluating multiple protocols, we examined and evaluated different
GOOSE protocol implementations on two devices from reputable manufacturers and a
Raspberry Pi running libiec61850.
Through creation of this testbed generating valid GOOSE communications and cyberattack traffic, each device’s protocol implementation was evaluated. Through the generation
of DoS, Replay, and FDIA attacks, the benefits and shortcomings of each implementation’s
performance were outlined. Different response cases were found for Replay and FDIA attack. Device 1 was reliable in response time, maintaining less than 7ms responses. However,
the relay disabled with a CPU error at 58 Mbps replay attack and 53 Mbps state number
attack. Due to this higher data rates are extremely dangerous for implementations and
require physical intervention to resume normal operation.
Device 2 had opposite results, with much higher response times averaging 15 ms, but a
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resilience to all evaluated attacks. The downfall of this implementation was the responses
increasing to almost 500ms at attack rates as low as 10 Mbps. The Raspberry Pi running
libiec61850 provided solid performance against DoS and replay attacks, but was unable
to recover after a state number attack was implemented. However, response times almost
tripled and successful responses were halved at 100 Mbps. Considering this device was
equipped with a 1 Gigabit Ethernet adapter, there are processing constraints that prevent the
device from keeping up with attack traffic.
Our future research will focus on the disabling of the Device 1 and expanding the
operation of the hardware agent to perform a large variety of attacks on different protocols.
In regards to the Device 1, investigation of more recent firmware releases will determine
whether the device vulnerability still exists. This work can be expanded to different devices in
the Device 1 architecture to identify whether the vulnerability exists across multiple devices
or just the Device 1. The testbed will also implement different OT protocols, expanding
from energy sector protocols to protocols in building automation and manufacturing. The
implementation of additional protocols will also allow for the testing to be evaluated on
different devices.
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